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undertakes to demonstrate that the entire system of doctrines, rules and
principles is an ingenious device which appellate courts use to keep trial
courts and juries under control. It is by means of these that they exercise
and extend their power. Once the appellate court says that the violation
of a so-called rule is not "prejudicial error" or that action on the part of
the trial court is "discretionary," we find that the rules of law involved
vanish like a snow bank under a summer sun. The appellate court may
still reverse but they must say why in terms of the particular case; and
in this they are handicapped by the fact that the trial court knows more
about the case than they do, and can state it in terms with which it is diffi-
cult to find fault. Elaborate rules give power to appellate courts; words
sounding in "discretion," "the facts of the case are peculiar," etc., trans-
fer the power to the trial court. The history of legal doctrine is in part,
at least, a history of the increase in the control which appellate courts have
insisted upon exerci.ing behind the lines.
No one interested in legal institutions can afford to miss the stimulation
which an intelligent consideration of the ideas in this book will afford. It
is the starting point for new intellectual adventures. The reviewer pre-
dicts that it will perhaps be the inspiration of a study, such as has not
yet been made, of the American Trial Court. In spite of the fact that its
activities are all that most litigants are ever concerned with, this great
institution still lies buried under layers of legal dialectic.
New Haven, Conn. THun=AN W. AnN0LD.
InternationaZ Arbitration from Athcnos to Locarno. By Jackson
H. Ralston. Stanford University, Calif., Stanford University
Press, 1929. pp. xvi, 417. $5.
THE author of this book has rendered such useful service to the profession
by his digest of the decisions and holdings of international tribunals in his
Law a-ad Procedure of Intenatiotal Tribuyals and he has in other ways
manifested so high a degree of social usefulness that we were entitled to
expect more from a work bearing so expansive a title as the one under
review. The reviewer was a little taken aback by the statement in the
preface that "the only book containing in detail pronouncements of arbi-
tral and other international courts of justice remains the Law and Proce-
dure of InternatirnaI Tribu=Nal by the present author." Thus to overlook
the sx-volume work of Moore, which is still the source book for most work
of the kind the author has here undertaken, excites wonder.
The book is mainly descriptive rather than analytical. It is divided into
five parts, of which the first, derived largely from the digest paragraphs
of the author's previous volume above mentioned, seems the best. This
part deals with the functions of international tribunals, the reservations to
arbitration teaties, the essentials of the compromis, the question of juris-
diction, the form and procedure of arbitration, the internal law of arbitral
tribunals, and international awards, including the sources of their invalid-
ity and their force. The author indulges his known strictures upon inter-
national law announced in his Dcnocraqy's I tzational Law and ex-
pounds his thesis that international law is largely contrary to the "natural
law" governing individuals. As he makes his own definition of natural
law, namely, the psychological reactions produced by certain stimuli, it is
not easy to quarrel with him. But he speaks not profoundly of a much
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discussed subject. He properly objects to titles based on conquest and the
supposedly binding character of treaties imposed by duress and violence.
The historical fact, however, seems to be that, unless such treaties are
acquiesced in, they rarely last long. His strictures upon the laws of war
and neutrality, which he refuses to recognize as anything but practices,
whatever that may Mean, are unfounded. Admitting the folly of the
institution of war as a mark of a defective and retarded civilization, the
necessity for rules for conducting the duel, which materially affects third
parties, is self-evident. Without such rules, the chaos would become prac-
tically universal, and force completely subjugate law. Indeed, the surprise
should be not at occasional violation, but at the degree of observance. The
arbitral tribunals which Mr. Ralston discusses have enforced tnese rules,
thus refuting much of the author's argument. The objection to the sug-
gestion that arbitration is a process of compromise, and not judicial, not-
withstanding the distinguished name the suggestion bears, is well taken.
For the distinction between political and legal questions the author assem-
bles many quotations, but he has missed important ones, such as the con-
tributions of Lauterpacht. His emphasis on legislation as a necessary fac-
tor to facilitate arbitration and correct decisions, while endorsed by others,
is very debatable. On the power of tribunals to decide upon their own
jurisdiction, a most important question, the author overlooks the volu-
minous literature which developed out of the decision of the Rumanian-
Hungarian tribunal on the optants' question. Other decisions of mixed
arbitral tribunals in this connection deserve consideration. German litera-
ture is practically unnoticed throughout. On the Calvo clause as a juris-
dictional clause, the author quotes a number of divergent opinions, but
apparently leaves unmentioned the important decision of the Mexican-
United States tribunal in the North American Dredging Co. case 2 in 1926,
approved by the British-Mexican tribunal in Mexican Union Ry. Case.
On individuals before international courts (p. 68), much more should have
been said; the subject has a literature. So with the "interior law of in-
ternational tribunals."
Part II, on the influences working toward judicial settlement, deals with
the movements-literary, legislative, and propagandist-which promoted
international arbitration. A chapter is devoted to Latin-American work,
but the Jay treaty is better entitled to mention among the modern pioneers.
Part III, on the history of arbitral tribunals, devotes two chapters (36
pages) to the 2200 years from ancient Greece to the Jay treaty. Most of
the information in this sketchy record comes from Raeder, Tod, and Phillip-
son. The notable contributions to arbitration of the 12th and 13th cen-
turies among the Italian city-states, so learnedly recorded and analyzed by
Frey,4 are not even mentioned. A fragmentary account is given of the
early American arbitrations and those to which the United States and
Great Britain, the United States and Mexico, and the United States and
other countries have been parties-all of them, down to 1896, fully covered
by Moore; a few arbitrations between other nations are also briefly
described. Darby did much of this work, but for reference a new
recital is not without utility. The work of the defunct Central American
Court of Justice is briefly set forth. To the important mixed arbitral tri-
bunals under the recent peace treaties, three pages are devoted. Several
2 North American Dredging Co. of Texas v. United Mexican States
(1926) 20 Am. J. INT. LAw 800.
3 (1930) 24 Am. J. INT. LAW. 388, 394.
4 See Book Review (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. LAW 192.
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important recent arbitrations, such as that of the Standard Oil Company
against the Reparation Commission,5 do not appear to be noted.
Parts IV and V deal with the work of The Hague conferences, which
were indeed most important for arbitration, and with the cases before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International
Justice. International commissions of inquiry are noted. As a descriptive
survey of modern arbitrations, the work will be of interest. As an analy-
tical or philosophical work, it largely fails. Perhaps the author had no
such aspirations.
New Haven, Conn. EDWIN M. BORCHARD.
The Poor Law Code. By W. Ivor Jennings. London, Charles
Knight & Co., Ltd., 1930. pp. Lxxx,,iii, 302. 10/6.
THIS book, unlike many of the published annotations of English statutes,
is not dedicated merely to the needs of the practicing solicitor or barrister.
By means of a masterly introduction, which is entitled, "The Administra-
tion of the Poor Law," Mr. Jennings traces the evolution of poor relief in
Great Britain from the original acts in 1388 to the last revisions in 1930.
It is through this essay, and the author's summary of the general effect of
each section of the Poor Law Act, 1930, that the book presents for Ameri-
can students a concise but carefully considered survey of this important
phase of local government in England.
The significance of the Poor Law Act, 1930, rests, as Mr. Jennings points
out, not so much in the number of new amendments to existing statutes, as
in the fact that by it "for the first time the poor law is reduced to manage-
able proportions, and any intelligent person, even though be has no legal
training, can now see at least the main principles of the law" (p. lxxi).
This is a normal outcome of the evolution of parliamentary acts. Cen-
turies of accumulation in the form of superimposed statutes and depart-
mental rules and orders eventually create an unwieldy mass of enactments,
difficult to administer, and often defectively bound together. Then it be-
comes necessary for Parliament by one new act to correlate and simplify.
The most important modern change in the method of poor relief occurred
in 1929 through the Local Government Act of that year. The Poor Laws,
since the famous and still basic Act of 1601, had in many ways been the
core of local government powers. Each parish was given the power as well
as the duty to put its able-bodied unemployed to work, to provide appren-
ticeships for children, and to give relief to the elderly indigent. That
scheme was substantially unchanged until 1834, when, as a result of the
report of a famous Royal Commission, Parliament sought to remedy the
defects which had been brought to light during the intervening centuries.
The chief defects had been the faulty administration of the justices, in
whom control of poor relief had been vested, the heavy charges that had
fallen upon the landowners, and the failure of administrators to carry out
their duty under the Act of 1601 to find work for those who were able to
work. By the Act of 1834, the administration of poor relief was given to a
specially created Poor Law Commission. Relief to able-bodied persons
was curtailed, and an attempt was made to merge individual parishes into
larger districts for the purposes of the Act. Thereafter came the inevita-
ble crystallization of commission procedure, which, as in other cases, was
unpopular to the extent that efficiency was achieved at the expense of the
traditions of the British Constitution. In 1871, the Poor Law Commission
was absorbed by the Local Government Board, which in turn was super-
(1926) 22 Am. J. INT. LAW 404.
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